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Abstract 
 
We study the adoption of Common Application membership by private 
four-year postsecondary institutions and its role in explaining the growth in 
undergraduate applications.  Using data from the College Board’s Annual Survey 
of Colleges, proportional hazards models suggest that institutions respond to the 
net benefit of adoption.  We then estimate that membership increases applications 
by 5.7–7.0 percent and decreases yield rates by 2.8–3.9 percent.  Acceptance rates 
decrease for members when their local networks are large.  Falsification tests 
indicate that membership effects occur as a one-time adoption shock.  
Membership also decreases SAT scores and increases the percent students of 
color. 
JEL Code: I21 - Analysis of Education, L11 - Production, Pricing, and 
Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms, L14 - Transactional Relationships; 
Contracts and Reputation; Networks 
 
 1 Introduction 
Between 1975 and 2005, the share of first year students that applied to four or more 
institutions the previous year grew from 12.0 percent to 38.6 percent (Pryor, Hurtado, Saenz, 
Santos, and Korn 2007).  Our own estimates over the same period suggest that the mean number 
of applications received by private four-year institutions increased from 1,282 to 3,129.  One 
potential explanation for the growth in undergraduate applications is that the college wage 
premium has increased since the 1970s, particularly for graduates of highly selective institutions 
(Murphy and Welch 1993; Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1999).  Increasing market returns to 
postsecondary education may induce risk-averse prospective students to apply to more colleges 
and universities. 
An alternative explanation is that the market structure of postsecondary education has 
transformed from a collection of local markets into a nationally competitive marketplace (Hoxby 
1997).  This implies that colleges and universities have increasing incentives to increase 
institutional prestige.  Perhaps the most widely followed measure of prestige comes from the 
U.S. News and World Report’s (USNWR) America’s Best Colleges which rewards higher mean 
SAT scores, lower acceptance rates, and until recently, higher yield rates.  Annual changes in 
rankings have substantial consequences including the quality of students that enroll the following 
year (Monks and Ehrenberg 1999).  There is even some evidence that college and universities 
manipulate admissions processes to boost USNWR rankings in otherwise counterproductive 
ways (Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick 2004). 
Our focus in this paper is on an institutional choice that enhances USNWR prestige by 
generating advantageous changes in undergraduate admissions outcomes.  Each year since 1975, 
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the Common Application (CAPP) non-profit organization issues a standardized application form 
that prospective students may submit to institutions that pay the membership fee.  We present a 
model where membership decreases the opportunity time cost of completing an application for 
prospective students and increases the number of applications received by the institution.  
Membership also exhibits network externalities because it reduces the application price at all 
other member institutions causing membership effects to grow with network size. 
To empirically test our model, we analyze the diffusion of CAPP adoption among 
private, postsecondary institutions between 1975 and 2005 using the College Board’s Annual 
Survey of Colleges.  Estimates from proportional hazards models stratified by Carnegie 
classification suggest the presence of network externalities: the probability of adoption 
conditional on being at risk increases with the membership share in the state, division, or region.  
We also find that higher membership fees decrease the conditional probability of adoption which 
is surprising given that they are small relative to annual institutional revenues. 
We then directly estimate the effects of CAPP membership on a set of undergraduate 
admissions outcomes.  To our knowledge, our paper is the first to emphasize the effects of 
application prices; the closest studies estimate the effects of list and net tuition on application 
behavior (Savoca 1990; Curs and Singell 2002).  OLS and two-stage least squares models show 
that membership increases applications, admittances, and enrollment and decreases yield rates.  
Interaction terms reveal differential impacts such as the presence of network externalities for 
applications and acceptance rates.  We also conduct a series of falsification tests that vary the 
timing of adoption and show that membership effects occur as a one-time shock at adoption.  
These dynamics and the presence of network externalities suggest that competition-driven CAPP 
membership diffusion contributes to the growth in applications. 
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CAPP membership may also affect the characteristics of applicants, admitted prospective 
students, and enrolled students.  In fact, the mission statement of the CAPP non-profit 
organization includes a commitment to promote equity and access (The Common Application, 
2007).  Unfortunately, data restrictions force us to focus on the characteristics of enrolled 
students rather than on applicants or admitted prospective students.  We find that CAPP 
membership results in a small decrease in mean SAT scores and large increase the percent 
students of color.  Membership thus not only affects the number of people at each stage of the 
admissions process but the characteristics of those that ultimately enroll as well. 
2 Application Prices and the College Admissions Process 
Recent studies of postsecondary education emphasize enrollment responses to the tuition 
paid by prospective students (Leslie and Brinkman 1988; Dynarksi 2002; Van Der Klaauw 2002; 
Avery and Hoxby 2004).  Less attention is paid to the application stage, although there is some 
evidence that the probability of applying to an institution decreases with list or expected net 
tuition (Savoca 1990; Curs and Singell 2002).  Our focus in this paper is on the effects of 
application price changes on applications and admissions outcomes more broadly.  Expanding 
applicant pools is of increasing importance because to boost prestige, many institutions seek 
lower acceptance rates and offer preferentially packaged financial aid to enroll the optimal set of 
applicants. 
2.1 Student and Institution Behavior with the CAPP 
Our model of college admissions begins with the decision to submit applications by 
prospective students and builds on Manski and Wise (1983).  Students choose whether to apply 
to an institution by comparing the utilities with and without enrollment at the institution.  We 
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assume that the utility of enrollment increases with institutional prestige based on institutional 
characteristics the previous year.  This is consistent with prospective students assessing quality 
based current USNWR rankings.  This also assumes that prospective students do not anticipate 
any effects of CAPP membership on institutional quality. 
The utility of enrollment decreases with the application price which consists of the 
opportunity time cost of completing an application form and the monetary fee assessed by the 
receiving institution.1  Using the CAPP application form when it is accepted decreases the 
opportunity time cost but has no effect on the monetary fee.  The reduction in overall price 
generates additional applications.  This occurs both on the intensive margin, where existing 
applicants increase the number of applications submitted, and on the extensive margin, where 
new prospective students start applying for college because the overall cost is lower. 
A salient feature of the membership is that it exhibits network externalities.  Network 
externalities exist when the benefit of a good changes with the number of other agents 
consuming the same type of good (Liebowitz and Margolis 2004).  In this context, the time cost 
savings to a prospective student occurs at every institution that accepts the standardized form.  
Membership effects are greater when the network size is large. 
How do institutions respond to the increase in applications?    Colleges and universities 
that accept the CAPP application form will receive additional applications from qualified 
prospective students and prospective students who are likely to enroll if granted admission (such 
as students applying to “reach” schools).  Institutions that focus on selectivity and yield rates as 
components of prestige increase admittances because there are newly desirable prospective 
students in the applicant pool.  This implies that CAPP membership will have an ambiguous 
                                                 
 
1 Recently, some institutions issue fee waivers for online applicants. 
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effect on acceptance rates (admittances / applications).  Lastly, we assume that institutions have 
constant enrollment targets in the short-run to generate sufficient tuition revenue but not exceed 
capacity constraints.  Thus, membership unambiguously decreases yield rates (enrollment / 
admittances). 
2.2 The Diffusion of CAPP 
Our model assumes that the membership benefits for colleges and universities are the 
additional applications, and possibly lower acceptance rates, that are rewarded with USNWR 
prestige.  The costs are the CAPP membership fees and the intended and unintended 
consequences on student body characteristics.  While we are able to measure some aspects of 
student characteristics such as SAT scores, percent students of color, and percent low-income 
students, we undoubtedly ignore others that may foster enthusiasm or resistance at some 
institutions.2
We employ the diffusion of innovations model to analyze the institutional adoption of 
CAPP membership.  Firms adopt an innovation when the net benefits of doing so are positive.  
For example, net benefits may increase with firm size when the profit of successful adoption 
exhibits economies of scale (Davies 1979 as described by Baptista 1999).  Larger firms may also 
be better able to bear the risk of unsuccessful innovations. 
In a representative reduced-form approach, Rose and Joskow (1990) show that larger 
firms are indeed more likely to adopt coal-fired steam-electric generating technology in the 
electric utility industry.  Moreover, the probability of adoption conditional on being at risk 
increases with the cost of pre-innovation technology.  Adoption may also be more likely when 
                                                 
 
2 The University of Chicago recently debated CAPP membership where opponents claimed that 
membership would change the character of the institution.  This institution has called its 
undergraduate application the Uncommon Application since 1998. 
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the net benefit of the innovation exhibits network externalities.  For example, controlling for 
other economies of scale, banks with more local branches have higher probabilities of ATM 
(automatic teller machines) adoption conditional on being at risk (Saloner and Shepard 1995).  
This approach may also include the strategic components of adoption.  The conditional 
probability of ATM adoption by banks increases when competitors adopt the previous period, a 
phenomenon Hannan and McDowell (1987) describe as rival precedence. 
However, external validity may be a concern when studying the diffusion of industry-
specific innovations: it is not obvious that the diffusion of coal-fired steam electric technology or 
ATMs operate like innovations in postsecondary education.  We are only aware of one study, 
Getz, Siegfried, and Anderson (1997), that applies this approach to postsecondary education.  
For thirty technologies including library, computing, and classroom innovations, the probability 
of adoption conditional on being at risk depends on public or private control, financial resources, 
and institution type (liberal arts, research, or university). 
3 Data and Empirical Methods 
The CAPP non-profit organization generously provided us with the complete adoption 
history of all institutional members since its inception in 1975.  Our sample, which includes 
members and non-members, consists of four-year private colleges and universities in the College 
Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges that meet minimal data requirements.3  We exclude public 
institutions because they comprise only 4 percent of members in 2005 with the first adoption 
                                                 
 
3 The sample consists of institutions that report in 1974 and 2005, respond for at least 20 years, 
and contain at least 10 years of data on applications.  Our empirical findings are robust to 5-year 
variations in the latter two requirements.  We drop other-type Carnegie classification institutions 
and those missing mean SAT scores throughout the panel.  There is no College Board data in 
1975, 1977, 1980, 1981, or 1983.  We impute missing values for interior points with linear 
interpolation and exterior points with the outermost non-missing value. 
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occurring in 2001.  The final sample consists of 638 institutions in each year from 1975 to 2005, 
of which 250 adopt in some year.  Each observation consists of institutional data for first year 
undergraduate students in year t where their applications and applications submitted by those 
denied admission or did not enroll were actually submitted in year t–1. 
 
[Figure 1. Applications by CAPP Status] 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the mean number of applications per year for institutions with CAPP 
membership in some year and those that never adopt.  Institutions that never adopt experienced a 
130 percent growth in average applications over the entire period from 836 applications in 1974 
to 1,926 applications in 2005.  In contrast, average applications at institutions with membership 
experience grew 162 percent from 1,900 in 1974 to 4,996 in 2005.  While this suggests 
differential trends in applications by membership, selection may be an issue because mean 
applications for these groups were different before the CAPP non-profit organization was 
created. 
 
[Table 1. Sample Means in 1974] 
 
 
CAPP and non-CAPP institutions vary by other characteristics as well.  Table 1 presents 
mean institutional characteristics in 1974, one year before the onset of risk; we reject the 
hypotheses that the means for the two groups are equal for each admissions outcome and 
institutional characteristic except percent Masters and the location dummy variables.  CAPP 
institutions have greater applications, admittances, and enrollment.  They also have lower 
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acceptance and yield rates and higher mean SAT scores.4  CAPP institutions are more likely to 
be PhD institutions as designated by their Carnegie classification, where each institution is a 
Doctoral (PhD), Masters (MA), or Bachelors (BA) institution.  We also collect application fee 
and list tuition data (in 2005 dollars) for 1985–2005 and find that CAPP institutions have greater 
application fees and list tuition in 1985.5
We describe the empirical diffusion strategy next because the resulting estimates will 
inform the subsequent program evaluation section of the paper.  Our analysis of adoption centers 
on the hazard rate h in Equation 1.  The hazard rate of institution i in state s in period t is the 
instantaneous probability of adopting CAPP membership conditional on not having adopted by 
period t. 
 
 ( ) ( )( )ististist
ististist
ististist tF
tfth
X
XX
,pctcapp,memberfee|1
,pctcapp,memberfee|,pctcapp,memberfee| −=  (1) 
 
 
The hazard rate depends on the CAPP membership fee.  The CAPP non-profit 
organization set constant price schedules for 1980–1982, 1983–1992, 1993–1999, 2000–2001, 
and 2002–2005.  Institutions are sorted into groups based on the previous year’s total number of 
applications, and all institutions within a group are charged the same price.  For example, the 
price schedule in 1993–1994 charged institutions with 0–999 applications $550, 1,000–1,499 
applications $600, 1,500–1,999 applications $650, and 2,000–2,499 applications $700, 2,500–
                                                 
 
4 Mean SAT scores are re-centered and calculated as the average of the 25th and 75th percentile 
score at the institution.  When missing, we convert ACT scores into re-centered SAT scores. 
5 We impute missing tuition in the Annual Survey of Colleges with values from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).  In cases where IPEDS reports tuition and fees 
together, we subtract estimated fees based on within-institution averages of the fee to total cost 
ratio over the entire period. 
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2,999 applications $750, and 3,000 or more applications $800.6   We convert the price of 
membership into the fee per first year enrolled student in 2005 dollars (memberfeeist).  The mean 
price across all years is $3.36 per first year student. 
The second variable of interest is our measure of network size, the CAPP membership 
rate in the network (excluding institution i) in state s in period t (pctcappist).  Ideally, we would 
construct annual revealed-preference networks of the type described in Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, 
and Metrick (2004), but such data were not available to us.  Instead, we define network 
competitors as other private institutions the state, although we experiment with specifications 
using Census divisions and regions instead.  Lastly, the hazard rate depends on a vector of 
institutional characteristics Xist which includes mean SAT score (satist), mean SAT score squared 
(satsqist), percent on-campus students (pctcampusist), percent in-state students (pctinstateist), 
religious affiliation (religionist), urban location (urbanist), and rural location (ruralist). 
 
[Figure 2. Smoothed Hazard Estimates by Carnegie Classification] 
 
 
We present two non-parametric estimates of the hazard rate in Figure 2 and Figure 3 to 
guide our analysis.  Each line is a kernel density estimator of the hazard rate for institutions 
disaggregated by Carnegie classification or by SAT group with bandwidths that minimize mean 
integrated squared error.  The SAT groups are 0 to 33 (low), 34 to 66 (middle), and 67 to 100 
(high) percentiles of the mean SAT score.  To fix groups, we categorize institutions based on 
their 1974 values. 
                                                 
 
6 Members that use the CAPP application form exclusively were charged $100 between 1980–
1982 and 1983–1992.  More recently, institutions are charged an additional membership fee for 
each online application submitted and a surcharge for online supplements.  Prices for 1975 to 
1979 are unavailable and are imputed with 1980 prices. 
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[Figure 3. Smoothed Hazard Estimates by SAT Group] 
 
 
The hazard rates have three inflection points with local maxima just after the inception of 
the CAPP non-profit organization and again in the mid-1990s.  Wilcoxon tests reject the 
hypotheses that the hazard rates by Carnegie classification or by SAT group are equal.  PhD and 
most selective institutions consistently have the greatest conditional probabilities of adoption.  
The shapes of the hazard rates, particularly those of MA and BA institutions that cross between 
periods 12 and 13, do not conform to any of the well-known functions (i.e. exponential or 
Weibull).  This suggests that a fully parametric specification of these forms would be 
misspecified.  Thus, we estimate semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model stratified by 
Carnegie classification as presented in Equation 2.  Each Carnegie classification has its own 
baseline hazard rate, but we assume that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the 
same across groups.  Our discussion above leads us to expect that β1<0 and β2>0. 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
{ }BA MA, PhD,
pctcappmemberfeeexp,pctcapp,memberfee| 210
∈
++=
j
thth ististist
j
ististist γXX ββ  (2) 
 
 
The second part of our analysis estimates the effects of CAPP membership on a set of 
undergraduate admissions outcomes: applications, admittances, enrollments, acceptance rates, 
yield rates, mean SAT scores, percent students of color, and percent low-income students. We 
calculate admissions outcomes for each first year cohort (combining full-time and part-time) 
except for the percent low-income students which is not available.  Instead, we use the percent of 
all undergraduate students (both full-time and part-time) that receive Pell Grants as a measure of 
percent low-income students. 
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We employ a standard program evaluation approach in Equation 3 where we regress log 
admissions outcome k for institution i in state s in year t on a set of institutional characteristics.  
Our primary focus is on the coefficient on membership status in year t–1 (cappist–1), .  In this 
section, we include Carnegie classification dummy variables as an institutional characteristic 
( ).  We also include the log of list tuition (log_tuition
k
3θ
k
cσ ist–1) in t–1 because previous studies 
show it to be associated with applications (Savoca 1990; Curs and Singell 2002), yield rates 
(Avery and Hoxby 2004), and enrollment (Allen and Shen 1999).  We do not correct for the 
effects of grants, loans, or other financial aid on tuition in this paper.  A novel feature of our 
analysis is that we include the application fee (log_applyfeeist–1) in t–1 in 2005 dollars which to 
our knowledge has yet to be used in the literature.7  Our prior is that <0 for applications.  
Because application fees are unavailable in the early years of the panel, we restrict the evaluation 
sample to 1985 to 2005. 
k
1θ
The remaining independent variables are membership status and institutional 
characteristics in t–1 with institution, state, and year fixed-effects.  Institution fixed effects 
control for unobserved time-constant characteristics such as the character of the student body, the 
quality of athletic programs, and neighborhood amenities, and the state and year fixed effects 
control for demographic and market structure changes.    We also restrict the sample to 
institutions that report admissions data in both t and t–1 to match those used our falsification 
tests described in the next section. 
                                                 
 
7 We also include a dummy variable for no application fee. 
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Because membership may be endogenous, we estimate two-stage least squares models 
using the insights generated from our diffusion model estimates.  We approximate CAPP 
membership status in t–1 with a linear probability model and use membership and membership 
rate in the state in t–2 and t–3.  With this approach, we assume that these characteristics have no 
effect on admissions outcomes other than through their effects on membership in t–1. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Diffusion of CAPP Adoption 
We present our estimates for the baseline proportional hazards model in Table 2.  We use 
time-invariant independent variables (t=1974) to fix groups as they were before the CAPP 
program.  Only membership fee and network size are time-varying independent variables.  The 
left panel uses the full sample of institutions where the baseline hazard is allowed to vary by 
Carnegie classification.  The first column excludes institutional controls Xist and shows that the 
conditional probability of adoption decreases by 25 percent for a one dollar increase in the 
membership fee per enrolled student.8  We find suggestive evidence of network externalities 
where a one percentage point increase in the membership rate in the state raises the hazard rate 
by 2.2 percent.  Because the average state in the sample has 13.6 private institutions, this implies 
that an additional member in the network raises the hazard rate by 16.2 percent. 
Column 2 adds the set of institutional controls.  In general, institutions with higher SAT 
scores are more likely to adopt CAPP membership conditional on being at risk with a peak at 
1320 SAT points (95th percentile).  Institutions with higher rates of on-campus residence are also 
more likely to adopt, perhaps because they have greater financial costs of falling below 
                                                 
 
8 Marginal effects for relative probabilities are equal to exp(coefficient estimate). 
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enrollment targets.  Institutions with a religious affiliation are less likely to adopt membership 
because they are typically interested in a specific subset of potential applicants. 
 
[Table 2. Proportional Hazards Model, Coefficient Estimates] 
 
 
We disaggregate the sample by Carnegie classification and SAT group in the middle and 
right panels respectively.  This approach relaxes the assumption that the coefficients between 
groups are equal.  PhD institutions are the only group that does not respond to the price of 
membership, although this may be due to small sample size.  Nevertheless, these institutions 
typically have the greatest financial resources at their disposal.  The conditional probability of 
adoption increases with network size only for MA and middle SAT institutions which suggests 
that they are the ones that benefit most from the network externalities that accompany CAPP 
membership. 
We also estimate several variants of these models which are not formally presented here 
but are available from the authors upon request.  First, the construction of the membership fee 
opens the possibility that the negative effects presented in Table 2 are due to the number of 
applications rather than the cost of the innovation.  When we control for institution size with log 
applications or log enrollment, the negative effect of membership fee persists.  Second, we 
experiment with defining networks as competitors in the Census division or region because 
prospective students are increasingly applying to colleges and universities outside their home 
states (Hoxby 19997).  We find evidence of network externalities at these broader geographic 
levels that are similar to those using state-based networks.9  We also estimate models that use the 
number of members in the network or whether a member in the network adopted the previous 
                                                 
 
9 See Appendix Table 1. 
 13
year but do not find any evidence that they predict adoption.  We take this as evidence against 
the rival precedence behavior found in previous empirical adoption studies (Hannan and 
McDowell 1987). 
Our results are also robust to using time-varying measures of all independent variables.  
Because the non-parametric estimates in Figure 2 show that the hazard rates for MA and BA 
institutions cross, we verify that the results are not an artifact of our missing data imputation 
procedure that allocates Carnegie classification in 1988 to 1975–1987.  Our results are robust to 
artificially left-censoring the data in 1988. 
The sample also includes 25 institutions that join and then drop CAPP membership.  We 
estimate a probit model for the probability of dropping membership for the set of institutions that 
ever adopt.  Using the same set of independent variables described above, we find that 
institutions with smaller networks that had become CAPP members are more likely to eventually 
drop their membership. 
4.2 Admissions Outcomes 
We now turn to estimating the effects of CAPP membership on admissions outcomes.  
We present the results from our OLS estimates in Table 3 where each column is a separate 
regression for undergraduate admissions outcome k.  Our main finding is that CAPP membership 
in t–1 is associated with a 5.7 percent increase in applications (reported in t but occurring in t–1).  
This is the first evidence that a reduction in the application price generates an increase in the 
number of applications.  We also find that CAPP membership is associated with a 5.2 percent 
change in admittances and a 3.7 percent change in enrollment.  When we estimate the effects on 
the acceptance rate directly, we find no evidence of any membership effect.  In contrast, 
membership is associated with a –2.8 percent change in yield rate.  Our interpretation is that 
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institutional membership expands the applicant pool but draws in some applicants who are less 
likely to enroll if admitted. 
 
[Table 3. OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes] 
 
 
We also control for log application fee and log tuition in t–1.  An increase in the 
monetary application fee reduces applications with an own-price elasticity of –0.062.  An 
interesting result is that charging a higher application fee increases yield rates, and our 
interpretation is that higher application fees limit the applicant pool to more “serious” applicants.  
This result is consistent with the negative effect of membership on yield rates.  List tuition is 
weakly negatively associated with enrollment, although we do not emphasize the results here due 
to usual omitted ability problems (Dynarski 2002).  We also find that the yield rate decreases 
with the listed tuition which is consistent with Parker and Summers (1993). 
Institutional membership in CAPP may also generate changes in the characteristics of the 
students that ultimately enroll at the institution.  CAPP membership in t–1 is associated with a 
1.1 percent decrease in mean SAT scores.  We also find that membership is associated with a 
15.4 percent change in the percent students of color and a 2.4 percent change in the percent Pell 
Grant recipients.  These results suggest that CAPP membership enables institutions to enroll a 
more diverse study body by enrolling more students of color and those from low-income 
households.  This is consistent with previous evidence that low-income applicants benefit most 
from increased information on the college application process (Avery and Kane 2004), but a 
more rigorous test of this hypothesis should be conducted with applicant micro-level data. 
 
[Table 4. OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes, Interaction Terms] 
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We test whether the effects of membership on admissions outcomes varies by two key 
institutional characteristics in Table 4.  The top panel presents estimates for OLS specifications 
that include the interaction between CAPP membership in t–1 and network size in t–1.  We find 
evidence of network externalities in that a one percentage point increase in the network size is 
associated with a 0.1 percent increase in applications for CAPP members.  We find similar 
evidence of network externalities in that the acceptance rate falls with the network size in the 
state. 
The bottom panel presents estimates that include the interaction between membership and 
mean SAT score.  Membership increases applications more at lower SAT institutions, perhaps 
because applicants apply to more “safety” schools once the cost of doing so decreases.  These are 
also the institutions that may have trouble attracting students.  Admittances increase more at 
lower SAT member institutions which suggests that they expect the newly admitted students to 
be less likely to matriculate or are further from their capacity constraints.  Member institutions 
with higher SAT scores experience a decrease in the acceptance rate which provides evidence 
that it is the most selective institutions that benefit from membership in terms of USNWR 
rankings.  In addition, the yield rate declines less in absolute value at higher SAT score colleges 
and universities.  As expected, applicants that get into the most prestigious schools enroll there if 
admitted.  These results confirm the positive effects of network size and mean SAT score on the 
hazard rate of adoption. 
 
[Table 5. 2SLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes] 
 
 
The diffusion estimates presented in the previous subsection indicate that CAPP 
membership is endogenous.  To control for this endogeneity, Table 5 presents the IV estimates 
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using membership status and membership rate in the state t–2 and t–3 instruments for 
membership in t–1.  This procedure has little effect on the CAPP membership coefficients.  
Membership increases applications by 6.0 percent, admittances by 5.7 percent, and enrollment by 
3.5 percent.  There is also –3.7 percent change in yield rates.  Lastly, we continue to find that 
membership decreases SAT scores and increases the percent students of color but that it no 
longer has any effect on the percent of Pell Grant recipients. 
 
[Table 6. First Difference Falsification Tests] 
 
 
As a robustness check, we estimate a series of falsification tests based on the first 
difference equation presented in Equation 4.  Differencing current and one-year lagged CAPP 
membership (t–1+l and t–2+l) implies that we are estimating the effect of adoption and not 
membership on admissions outcome k.  This approach will show whether membership effects are 
consistent with the timing of adoption and whether the effects persist over time.  A membership 
effect associated with adoption that has not yet taken place would suggest that the program 
evaluation estimates are misspecified. 
 
  (4) 
{ }2,1,0,1,2
,
nlog_tuitioapplyfeelog_admislog_
114
131ist21ist1
k
ist
−−∈
+Δ++
+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ
−−
+−−−
l
pctcapp
capp
k
isttistist
k
list
kkk
μσφ
φφφ
kτX
 
 
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that the effects of adoption occur at adoption.  Adoption 
in t–1 increases applications by 7.0 percent and admittances by 4.3 percent in t.  There is no 
effect on enrollment, but adoption last year decreases both acceptance rates and yield rates.  The 
lack of systematic significant effects for two or three year lagged adoption suggests that the 
dynamics of membership effects are a one-time persistent jump at adoption.  The non-significant 
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coefficients in the future suggest that there is no Ashenfelter-dip phenomenon taking place here 
(Ashenfelter 1978). 
5 Concluding Remarks 
We find evidence that Common Application membership is a strategic decision by 
private colleges and universities.  CAPP membership increases applications by 5.7 to 7 percent 
and admittances by 4.3 to 5.9 percent.  We find evidence of network externalities in that the 
effects on applications and acceptance rates change with our measure of network size.  These 
results are consistent with the diffusion estimates that show the net benefit as measured by these 
characteristics increase the hazard rate of adoption.  Our analysis of CAPP membership supports 
the hypothesis that the postsecondary education market has structurally evolved into a more 
competitive marketplace. 
We also find that CAPP membership affects the composition of students that ultimately 
enroll.  In both OLS and two-stage least squares specifications, membership is associated with a 
small decrease in SAT scores and a sizeable increase in the percent students of color.  We also 
find some evidence that membership is associated with a small increase in the percent of Pell 
Grant recipients at the institution.  These results suggest that the Common Application non-profit 
organization has had some success in meeting its goals of increased access and equity. 
There are at least two limitations to our analysis.  First, we do not address the fact that 
many institutional members require applicants to complete supplemental forms.  These forms 
provide institutions with idiosyncratic information unavailable in the standardized application 
form.  In fact, unpublished data from the College Board from 2000 to 2004 shows that over half 
of all institutions that accept the CAPP application form require applicants to complete at least 
one supplemental form.  A second limitation is that many institutions accept the CAPP 
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application form without actually paying the membership fee.  However, the prevalence of this 
activity is likely to decline over time because applicants are increasingly applying online – online 
applications are submitted directly to the CAPP non-profit organization rather than the 
institution.  Both of these limitations suggest that our estimates are lower bounds on the true 
effects of CAPP membership. 
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Figure 1. Applications by CAPP Status 
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Table 1. Sample Means in 1974 
 (1) (2) 
Admissions Characteristics Non-CAPP CAPP 
apply 835.598 1900.144 
admit 617.263 1182.688 
enroll 364.979 560.276 
acceptrate .842 .719 
yieldrate .640 .502 
sat 10.002 11.692 
pctsoc .110 .078 
pctpell .303 .192 
   
Institutional Controls Non-CAPP CAPP 
PhD .054 .172 
MA .340 .304 
BA .606 .524 
pctcampus .670 .797 
pctinstate .616 .479 
religion .822 .492 
urban .232 .252 
suburb .487 .504 
rural .281 .244 
applyfee (in 1985) 28.957 43.097 
tuition (in 1985) 8.926 13.456 
   
N 388 250 
Notes: sat in 100s and tuition in 1000s.  applyfee and 
tuition are in 2005 dollars. 
 23
 
Figure 2. Smoothed Hazard Estimates by Carnegie Classification 
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Figure 3. Smoothed Hazard Estimates by SAT Group 
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Table 2. Proportional Hazards Model, Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   Carnegie Classification SAT Group 
 All All PhD MA BA Low Middle High 
memberfee –0.286*** –0.193*** –0.113 –0.211** –0.197*** –0.340** –0.183* –0.110** 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.201) (0.105) (0.058) (0.162) (0.095) (0.054) 
pctcapp 0.022*** 0.008* 0.011 0.015** 0.000 –0.011 0.019** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) 
sat  5.382*** 5.655** 1.377 4.473*** 14.000 –52.569** 8.438***
  (0.927) (2.440) (3.051) (1.285) (17.791) (23.543) (3.232) 
satsq  –0.204*** –0.223** –0.025 –0.159*** –0.654 2.489** –0.329***
  (0.039) (0.100) (0.144) (0.054) (0.942) (1.088) (0.126) 
pctcampus  0.009** –0.006 0.009 0.020*** 0.009 0.005 0.014** 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
religion  –0.578*** –0.367 –0.227 –0.789*** –1.209** –0.525** –0.602***
  (0.151) (0.386) (0.267) (0.222) (0.557) (0.263) (0.221) 
log likelihood –1266.196 –1145.809 –165.870 –324.078 –637.790 –83.448 –298.372 –557.032 
N 15471 15471 1148 5856 8467 6715 5966 2790 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Models 2–8 include percent in-state students, urban 
location, and rural location as additional independent variables.  Models 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 are stratified by Carnegie 
classification.  Networks are at the state level.  All independent variables except membership fee and network size are fixed at 
1974 values. 
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Table 3. OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 apply admit enroll acceptrate yieldrate sat pctsoc pctpell 
L.log_applyfee -0.062*** -0.073*** -0.041*** -0.011 0.042*** 0.015*** 0.085*** -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.025) (0.013) 
L.log_tuition 0.004 0.180*** -0.065* 0.176*** -0.220*** -0.000 0.158*** 0.037 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.007) (0.060) (0.031) 
L.capp 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.037*** -0.004 -0.028*** -0.011*** 0.154*** 0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.022) (0.012) 
L.pctcapp_st -0.000 -0.001 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
L.sat 0.002 0.373*** 0.053 0.374*** -0.292***  -0.135* 0.138** 
 (0.053) (0.060) (0.042) (0.042) (0.047)  (0.080) (0.054) 
L.satsq 0.001 -0.018*** -0.003 -0.019*** 0.014***  0.004 -0.011***
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) 
L.pctcampus 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
L.religion 0.002 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 0.007 -0.012*** -0.063 0.074** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017) (0.005) (0.074) (0.032) 
R-squared 0.455 0.385 0.085 0.142 0.287 0.124 0.381 0.200 
N 10972 10960 12791 10941 10896 11014 10826 10702 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Models include one-year lagged dummy 
variable for no application fee, percent in-state students, urban location, rural location, and Carnegie classification dummy 
variables as additional independent variables and institution, state, and year fixed-effects.  Networks are at the state level. 
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Table 4. OLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes, Interaction Terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 apply admit enroll acceptrate yieldrate sat pctsoc pctpell 
L.capp 0.030* 0.055*** 0.032*** 0.023** -0.026** -0.014*** 0.239*** 0.037* 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.031) (0.020) 
L.pctcapp -0.001 -0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002***
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
L.capp * L.pctcapp 0.001** -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
 apply admit enroll acceptrate yieldrate sat pctsoc pctpell 
L.capp 0.243** 1.081*** 0.417*** 0.845*** –0.674***  0.283 0.534***
 (0.101) (0.089) (0.072) (0.065) (0.062)  (0.177) (0.105) 
L.sat 0.027*** 0.007 0.004 –0.019*** –0.004  –0.055*** –0.080***
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.010) (0.006) 
L.capp * L.sat –0.016* –0.089*** –0.033*** –0.073*** 0.056***  –0.011 –0.045***
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.015) (0.009) 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Models include one-year lagged dummy variable for 
no application fee, SAT and SAT squared, percent on-campus students, percent in-state students, religious affiliation, urban 
location, rural location, and Carnegie classification dummy variables as additional independent variables and institution, state, and 
year fixed-effects.  Networks are at the state level. 
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Table 5. 2SLS Membership Effects on Log Admissions Outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 apply admit enroll acceptrate yieldrate sat pctsoc pctpell 
L.log_applyfee -0.062*** -0.073*** -0.041*** -0.011 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.085*** -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.025) (0.013) 
L.log_tuition 0.004 0.180*** -0.065* 0.176*** -0.219*** -0.000 0.158*** 0.038 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035) (0.007) (0.060) (0.031) 
L.capp 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.035*** 0.000 -0.037*** -0.012*** 0.155*** 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.024) (0.014) 
L.pctcapp -0.000 -0.001 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
L.sat 0.002 0.374*** 0.052 0.375*** -0.294***  -0.135* 0.136** 
 (0.053) (0.060) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)  (0.080) (0.054) 
L.satsq 0.001 -0.018*** -0.003 -0.019*** 0.014***  0.004 -0.011***
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) 
L.pctcampus 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
L.religion 0.002 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 0.007 -0.012*** -0.063 0.073** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017) (0.005) (0.074) (0.032) 
R-squared 0.455 0.385 0.085 0.142 0.287 0.124 0.381 0.200 
N 10972 10960 12791 10941 10896 11003 10826 10702 
First stage F-stat 6100 6212 7303 6189 6153 5795 6262 5680 
Hansen-Sargan p 0.821 0.901 0.245 0.959 0.382 0.573 0.976 0.272 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Models include one-year lagged dummy 
variable for no application fee, percent in-state students, urban location, rural location, and Carnegie classification dummy 
variables as additional independent variables and institution, state, and year fixed-effects.  Networks are at the state level.  
Instruments for one-year lagged membership are two-year and three-year lagged membership and members share in the state.
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Table 6. First Difference Falsification Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 apply admit enroll acceptrate yieldrate sat pctsoc pctpell 
L3D.capp 0.025 –0.001 0.007 –0.026** –0.002 0.000 0.021 –0.022 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.003) (0.039) (0.018) 
L2D.capp 0.026 0.029 0.002 0.002 –0.022 0.002 0.014 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.003) (0.039) (0.018) 
LD.capp 0.070*** 0.043** 0.010 –0.029** –0.039** –0.001 0.041 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.003) (0.038) (0.016) 
D.capp –0.007 –0.005 –0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.066* –0.005 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.003) (0.037) (0.016) 
FD.capp 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.007 –0.005 –0.001 0.020 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) (0.003) (0.037) (0.017) 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Models include one-year lagged first difference of 
application fee, dummy variable for no application fee, log tuition, percent member, SAT and SAT squared, percent on-
campus students, percent in-state students, religious affiliation, urban location, rural location, and Carnegie classification 
dummy variables as additional independent variables and year fixed-effects.  Networks are at the state level. 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Proportional Hazards Models by Network Size Geography, Coefficient 
Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 State State Division Division Region Region 
memberfee –0.286*** –0.193*** –0.288*** –0.189*** –0.289*** –0.189***
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) 
pctcapp 0.022*** 0.008* 0.046*** 0.016** 0.047*** 0.022***
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
sat  5.382***  5.481***  5.513***
  (0.927)  (0.937)  (0.939) 
satsq  –0.204***  –0.209***  –0.210***
  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
pctcampus  0.009**  0.009**  0.010** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
religion  –0.578***  –0.542***  –0.510***
  (0.151)  (0.154)  (0.154) 
log likelihood –1266.196 –1145.809 –1259.188 –1145.109 –1260.333 –1143.141 
N 15471 15471 15471 15471 15471 15471 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Models 2, 4, and 6 include 
percent in-state students, urban location, and rural location as additional independent variables.  
Models 1–6 are stratified by Carnegie classification.  Networks are at the state (columns 1 and 2), 
division (columns 3 and 4), or region levels (columns 5 and 6).  All independent variables except 
membership fee and network size are fixed at 1974 values. 
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